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RESTRICTIVE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES
ANTI-TRUST LAWS
MARCELLUS R. MEEK
INTRODUCTION
PEAKING generally, it is not without legal consequence to say
that the field of Anti-trust legislation is one which is fraught
with inconsistencies and legal anomalies, out of which grows
confusion-thrice compounded by charge and counter-charge from
the business, legal and governmental camps.
There are few, if any, fields of law in which there is the same high
degree of dissension among lawyers and even law-makers themselves.
This is a natural consequence of the mass of legislation designed to
satisfy a myriad of dissimilar, if not conflicting, interests. Since 1890,
when the Sherman Anti-trust Act was passed, there have been no less
than thirty-four regulatory acts passed, whose function it was and is
to protect small businesses, prevent discriminatory practices, regulate
foreign trade or interstate commerce, and otherwise restrict the op-
eration of free enterprise.
Many of these Acts are conflicting. For example, the Sherman
Anti-trust Act was directed principally to group activity designed to
regulate the market, preventing competition and charging high prices,
while the Robinson-Patman Act passed in 1936, was specifically de-
signed to protect the small retailer from price-cutting practices and
favors stable and uniform prices. This is perhaps explained by the fact
that the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act were passed in
very different climates, but this fact in no wise affects the proposition
that both legislative enactments are still enforced and still present an
area of law into which businessmen must look before taking any
measures which will have the effect of disturbing the competitive
status quo.
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Illinois; LL.B., De Paul University College of Law; LL.M., Northwestern University
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Many of the laws referred to above have application, either by
design of the legislators or by judicial construction, to the foreign
operation of a domestic United States subsidiary or international trade
generally.
This introduction to the confused state of the law is intended to
acquaint the reader with the fact that the legal principles involved are
not settled and that legal scholars differ widely in their approach to
the subject, as well as in the conclusions which they draw in one or
another particular set of circumstances.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF UNITED
STATES LAW TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Restrictive trade practices prohibited by the Sherman Act may be
attacked under the broad interpretation of Sections 1 and 2 thereof,
or such conduct may be enjoined under Section 4 of the Sherman
Act, or it may be the source of a private civil remedy for damages
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894 specifically prohibits
conspiracies, combinations, agreements, etc.:
a) when the same is made by or between two or more persons or corporations,
either of whom, as agent or principal, is engaged in importing any article
from any foreign country into the United States, and
b) is intended to operate in restraint of lawful trade, or free competition in any
lawful trade or commerce, or to increase the market price in any part of the
United States or any article or articles imported or intended to be imported
into the United States, or any manufacture into which such imported article
enters or is intended to enter.
In the case of United States v. General Dystuff Corp.,' it was held
that the purpose of the Wilson Tariff Act was to make "explicit the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act in the field of foreign commerce." '2
However, it is necessary that there be a showing that the alleged con-
duct affects imports into the United States in a prohibited manner
before a violation of the Wilson Tariff Act is established. Thus, if a
commodity is not being imported into the United States, a foreign
restrictive agreement with respect thereto will not violate the Wilson
Tariff Act, although it might result in a violation of the Sherman Act.
It should be remembered, however, that the fact that the restrictive
agreement takes place outside of the United States does not exclude
it from consideration under the Sherman Anti-trust Act. In the recent
1 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. N.Y., 1944). 2 Ibid., at 648.
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case of United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Company,3 it was
held that the restrictive agreements made abroad and effected abroad
were nevertheless violative of the Act when they had a direct effect
on trade between the United States and foreign countries.
The question of whether or not the United States courts have
jurisdiction over restrictive agreements which take place outside the
United States, even though there is some effect within the United
States, has long been litigated and it is generally well settled that such
jurisdiction does exist. Other arguments have been made that such an
extra-territorial extension of the jurisdiction of our courts was un-
constitutional and in violation of general principles of International
Law, but all of these arguments have been rejected by the United
States Supreme Court.
The question of whether or not there exists an effect on the United
States commerce goes to the merits of to whether or not a violation
of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act exists, rather than to the
question of jurisdiction. It is specifically stated that the Act covers
offenses which involve trade or commerce with foreign nations.
RESTRICTIVE TRADE AGREEMENTS
DIVISION OF TERRITORIES
Many cases have held that an exclusive license or one which is
territorially limited is not illegal in and of itself, but patent licenses
and agreements for the exchange of technical information cannot
lawfully be used as a means for the division of world markets.4
Foreign subsidiaries, on the other hand, may be a means to a pro-
hibited end. Such subsidiaries are of course not unlawful whether they
be owned by a single United States manufacturer, as was the case in
United States v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company,5 or
by a group of American and foreign manufacturers as in the Timken
case. The DuPont case held that "it is not illegal per se for compet-
itors to combine their resources in a manufacturing joint venture to
exploit a particular product or a particular market," however, in all
of these cases, there must be no restrictive effect on trade or com-
883 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio, 1949), aff'd Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
4 United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D.C. Del.,
1953); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D. N.Y., 1945), aff'd 332
U.S. 319 (1947).
5 92 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. Mass., 1950).
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merce with foreign nations. Thus, jointly-owned foreign companies
may not be used as a means for effecting a division of territories and
a restriction of competition between the owner-companies or as a
method for carrying out a conspiracy in restraint of trade abroad
which affects United States exports or imports.
Ultimately, whether a foreign subsidiary has been employed for an
unlawful purpose is a question of fact and evidence must be intro-
duced to establish such fact. For instance, in the case of United States
v. Imperial Chemical Industries,6 it was shown that an American and
a foreign company were already established as competitors in a for-
eign market, before a jointly-owned company, formed for the exploi-
tation of such market for their mutual benefit, violated the statutes.
It was also proved that competition between the two companies had
diminished. Pre-existing competition, however, between the parties to
such an agreement is not absolutely necessary where the nature of the
respective international businesses in the same industry indicated that
competition between them in the market would be affected.
In every case, therefore, the particular facts of the case will control
and all of the surrounding circumstances will be taken into account
to determine whether or not a violation exists.
In order to understand the international application of the Anti-
trust Acts, it would perhaps be well to discuss some of the factual
situations existing in the cases which have been decided up to the
present time.
In the case of United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries7 Du-
Pont (an American company) and Imperial Chemical (an English
company) entered into restricted agreements with various European
companies with whom they had previously competed. Under these
agreements, the territories of the world were divided up, prices were
fixed, and profits determined.
These agreements were continued and effectuated by the formation
of various jointly-owned subsidiaries. There was an exchange of pat-
ents and processes, but there had been no previous license arrange-
ments. The products of the conspiring companies were different
though of the same class. In Canada, a jointly owned company was
formed on a fifty-fifty basis and exclusive license agreements were
signed which contained restrictive cross-covenants having the effect
6 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. N.Y., 1951).
7 Ibid. Supplemental opinion rendered 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. N.Y., 1952).
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of restraining exports and imports. Similar arrangements existed in
countries of South America.
The court held that the restrictive agreements were illegal and the
use of a jointly-owned subsidiary did not change the effect. It said:
We have found that the jointly-owned companies were means designed and
used by DuPont and II to avoid and prevent competition between themselves
and with others in the non-exclusive territories. They were a means used for
the accomplishment of the basic understanding for the division of world-wide
territories. We have found that not only were they intended to affect the export
and import trade of the United States but that the limitations placed on DuPont
and other American companies on the exports to these jointly-owned compa-
nies and the restrictions placed on these companies with respect to sales and
exports by them to the United States did achieve the purpose and end for which
they were organized. 8
The objectionable features of the arrangements in the Imperial case
are clearly defined. They are (1) division of territories, (2) price
fixing, (3) elimination of competition in world markets, thus of ex-
port and import.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision was to order divestiture of the
joint interests, cancellation of the contracts, and reassignment of
patents.
In the case of United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,9 an in-
junction was sought under Section 4 of the Sherman Act for viola-
tions of Sections 1 and 3 thereof. The complaint alleged the allocation
of territories, restrictive agreements as to each territory, and price
fixing and elimination of outside competition. The American corpo-
ration and two foreign corporations had a substantial portion of the
world market, and the American company had from 1941 to 1945,
71.0% to 78.9% of the U.S. market. British Timken had 90% of the
British market.
British and American Timken had been competitors previously,
and each owned fifty per cent of a French Timken company. The
three companies entered into agreements whereby they assigned ex-
clusive territories to each, and had a system of order referrals.
The Supreme Court ordered cancellation of the agreements, stating:
8 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D. N.Y., 1951). Cf., United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F. 2d 416 (C..A. 2d, 1945). The operations of these jointly-owned com-
panies were in violation of the law. United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513
(S.D. N.Y., 1945). "Nor do we find any support in reason or authority for the propo-
sition that agreements between legally separate persons and companies to suppress
competition among themselves and others can be justified by labelling the project a
'joint venture.'" Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
9 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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The fact that there is common ownership or control of the contracting corpo-
rations does not liberate them from the impact of the anti-trust laws. E.g., Keifer-
Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, supra at 215. Nor do we find any support in
reason or authority for the proposition that agreements between legally separate
persons and companies to suppress competition among themselves and others
can be justified by labeling the project a "joint venture." Perhaps every agree-
ment and combination to restrain trade could be so labeled.10
This case also illustrates the principle that it is not the method
employed, but the ultimate effect of the restrictive agreements ex-
pressing the intent of the parties involved.
The case of United States v. Holophane Co. Inc.," is one of great
importance in the field and is the most recent to date. The principal
defendant, Holophane Co. Inc., was a U.S. corporation. It was en-
gaged in the manufacture and sale of prismatic glassware and illu-
minating appliances containing prismatic glassware, as were the other
alleged conspirators in the case. The other companies involved were
Holophane Ltd., a company organized under the laws of Great
Britain and La Societe Anonyme Franfaise Holophane, a French
corporation.
In 1921, Holophane Ltd. entered into a patent license agreement
with the French Holophane in which it conveyed the right to make
and sell on an exclusive basis prismatic glassware under the existing
and future patents of Ltd. in Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland
and Italy. This was a five-year agreement, with an option to renew,
which was exercised. There were provisions for royalties under which
it was provided that the articles manufactured would be marked with
the name Holophane; the French company would not use the inven-
tions, designs, or trade name except in accordance with license; the
parties would mutually exchange discoveries and improvements; the
parties would not compete with each other; and the French company
would prevent exportation from the licensed countries to other areas
and Limited would prevent the export into France or the licensed
countries of Holophane goods. Such an agreement continued until
the time the action was filed in the instant case.
The controlling interest in both Limited and the French company
was held by an individual. Limited held all of the stock of the Holo-
phane Glass Company, Inc., a U.S. corporation. In 1925, a group of
executives and employees of the Holophane Glass Company, Inc.
10 Ibid., at 598.
11 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio, 1954), aff'd 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
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organized what came to be the defendant Holophane Company, Inc.,
for the purpose of purchasing the Holophane Glass Company from
Limited. This group actively managed the American corporation, and
entered into a trading agreement with Limited, wherein the territory
of the Holophane Company Inc. was defined as that part of the con-
tinent of America north of the Panama Canal and adjacent islands
(not including the West Indies), the Philippine Islands, the Republic
of Cuba, and the Empire of Japan. The territory of Limited was
defined as the whole of the world except the territory of the defend-
ant and the Republic of France and its colonies. The agreement con-
tained other restrictive covenants relating to the export into each
other's territory and each party agreed to communicate and assign
every invention, design, discovery or other improvement and trade-
mark to the other, and to render any aid necessary to enable the other
to secure proper protection in its territory.
Various modifications were made in the agreements between the
parties but they remained in substantially the same form, insofar as
they provided for mutual interchange of improvements and the allo-
cating of territories between them.
In fulfillment of their obligation, Limited and the French company
refrained from competition with each other and imposed upon their
customers and dealers contractual obligations not to export products
purchased from them into the territory of the defendant and similar
arrangements were made by Limited and the French company.
The court held that these practices were affecting adversely the
foreign commerce of not only Holophane Company, Inc. but also of
its customers and that the restrictive arrangement between the de-
fendant and the co-conspirators, Limited and the French company
were in unreasonable restraint of the interstate and foreign commerce
of the United States in prismatic glassware and appliances.
The decision of the District court was affirmed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court without comment, but certainly not without far-reach-
ing effect.
CONCLUSION
Speaking generally, so long as there are no restrictive arrangements
entered into between domestic United States corporations and the
foreign companies with whom they deal, or in which they have a
stock interest, there can be no violation of the anti-trust laws.
It is simply necessary that economic factors alone determine the
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conduct of companies with which American interests deal or in which
they have an interest. If these factors determine what the subsidiaries
are to produce and where the product is to be sold, there can be no
adverse effects in the anti-trust area.
Formal agreements, however, are not the only objectionable form
which restrictive practices can take. Other arrangements or under-
standings may serve as evidence of illegal restraints of trade and all
memoranda, unsigned documents, as well as correspondence are ad-
missible in evidence to show a violation of the United States anti-trust
laws.
Trademark licenses must, of necessity, be exclusive, and are not
subject to attack under the Sherman Act, so long as they are not
coupled with a division of territories or other restrictive covenants
such as have been outlined above. It is not unlawful to define the
territory in which a distributor, licensee, or jointly owned enterprise
is to operate, so long as there are no restrictive arrangements included.
While the Supreme Court of the United States has been firm in its
over-all application of the U.S. anti-trust laws to American business
abroad, there is widespread agitation for a re-evaluation of the ad-
verse effect which the Court's position has produced in the relation-
ship between the United States and foreign countries.
Analogies have been made between the principles underlying the
decision in Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Company Ltd.,12 which
involved the extra-territorial application of U.S. trademark law and
the principles of extra-territoriality of anti-trust law above outlined.
In the Vanity Fair Mills case, a Canadian corporate defendant,
operating under a Canadian patent, infringed the plaintiff's trademark
in the United States, but the District and Circuit Courts held that
they had no power to regulate a case where an alien defendant whose
infringing mark continued on the registry under the laws of his own
nationality, even though the infringement of U.S. trademark registra-
tion affected the United States commerce.
A special committee of the Association of the Bar of New York
City, under the direction of Harvard Law School Professor Kingman
Brewster, Jr., investigated the broad considerations involved in the
extra-territorial application of U.S. anti-trust laws and, in their report,
recommended that authority be granted to the President to grant
12 133 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. N.Y., 1955), 234 F. 2d 633 (C.A. 2d, 1956), cert. denied 352
U.S. 871 (1956).
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exemptions from the anti-trust laws in cases involving foreign rela-
tions or the national security.
The committee stated that the application by United States courts
of the anti-trust statutes to cases involving enterprises abroad has
aroused resentment in foreign nations and emphasized that an anti-
trust violation in the United States might not only be condoned
abroad but might be positively encouraged as a means of expanding
business and developing industry. The committee felt that such an
extra-territorial application of the law violated principles of inter-
national law which seek to "prevent a country's reaching beyond its
borders to attach activities carried on within foreign nations."
Whether the specific proposal made by the committee vests too
much power in the Executive Department in such cases, and whether
such a plan would be workable at all, is not decided here. Suffice it
to say that the seeming necessity for such an investigation indicates
dissatisfaction with the application of the law under present condi-
tions and foretells perhaps a re-examination of the Supreme Court's
position in the anti-trust cases.
